This paper examines how the scale and composition of public debt can affect economies that implement a combination of "passive" monetary policy and "active" fiscal policy. This policy configuration is argued to be of both historical and contemporary interest in the cases of the U.S. and Japanese economies. It is shown that higher average levels and moderate average maturities of debt can induce macroeconomic instability under a range of policies specified as simple rules. However, interest rate pegs in combination with active fiscal policies almost always ensure macroeconomic stability. This finding suggests that in periods where the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is a relevant constraint on policy design, a switch in fiscal regime is desirable.
Introduction
The conventional characterization of stabilization policy is that monetary policy stabilizes in ‡ation while …scal policy stabilizes debt through an appropriate adjustment in current or future taxation. The resulting equilibrium is Ricardian, so that debt-management policy has no monetary consequences. In the language of Leeper (1991) monetary policy is 'active'and …scal policy is 'passive'.
The appropriateness of this view as a general description of policy can certainly be questioned. Both recent events and certain historical episodes adduce evidence. In response to the US …nancial crisis 2007-2009 many economies have found monetary policy constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. At the same time, there has been substantial …scal stimulus that, at least initially, was provided without overt concern for the consequences of the level of the public debt. This policy con…guration can reasonably be characterized as an interest-rate peg combined with an exogenous …scal surplus. Here monetary policy is 'passive', …scal policy 'active', and the resulting equilibrium non-Ricardian -debt-management policy has monetary consequences.
Outside this recent episode, there is evidence of changing con…gurations of policy regime in the US in the post-war period that include passive monetary policy and active …scal -see Davig and Leeper (2006) . During the 1940s, a special case of this policy con…guration was actively pursued. Called a 'bond-price support'regime, interest rates on short-term treasury bills were pegged, with …scal policy assuming the role of active stabilization. Woodford (2001) argues that in ‡ation data from this period are consistent with the …scal theory of the price level. Outside the US, the Japanese economy has clearly experienced a prolonged period of low interest rates since the mid 1990s, with frequent attempts to spur economic activity through …scal stimulus. Again, this experience seems better characterized by a policy regime with passive monetary and active …scal policy. 1 And even if such depictions of policy are deemed inappropriate, it is not implausible to 1 The characterization of the Japanese policy regime has been a matter of active debate. Particularly given that stabilization policy appears to have failed, at least from the perspective of delivering robust and sustainable output growth. An important issue is the treatment of long-term …scal expectations -which would be no less important in a Ricardian characterization of dynamics. Standard models place tight structure on long-term beliefs regarding …scal solvency. Failure to cover issued debt with appropriate future taxation will induce an adjustment in goods price to revalue public debt.That resumption of normal economic activity has not occured with little evidence of in ‡ation in Japan questions the passive monetary and active …scal policy assumption. However, this likely re ‡ects the inconsistent …scal policy framework adopted by Japanese authorities. Each …scal expansion was soon followed with promises of consolidation. Appropriately modeling these announcement e¤ects on household expectations remains as important future work.
1 think households and …rms may entertain policy con…gurations of this kind. Indeed, Bianchi (2010) and Sims (2011) demonstrate that even if agents only maintain the possibility of an alternative regime in expectation, without that regime ever occurring, there can be important implications for dynamics. As well-known from Sargent and Wallace (1975) , passive …scal policy combined with an interest-rate peg delivers indeterminacy of rational-expectations equilibrium. Periods in which nominal interest-rate policy is constrained by the zero lower bound might be periods in which expectations are particularly susceptible to drift. As such it is worth exploring the stabilization consequences of this kind of policy regime.
To this end we consider a standard New Keynesian model of the kind frequently used for monetary policy evaluation, in which agents have incomplete knowledge about the structure of the economy. Incomplete knowledge is introduced to capture uncertainty about the prevailing policy regime, a characteristic of recent policy responses during the US …nancial crisis, particularly given the substantial uncertainty about the scale, scope and duration of various …scal policy initiatives. Households and …rms are optimizing, have a completely speci…ed belief system, but do not know the equilibrium mapping between observed state variables and market clearing prices. By extrapolating from historical patterns in observed data they approximate this mapping to forecast exogenous variables relevant to their decision problems, such as prices and policy variables. Because agents must learn from historical data, beliefs need not be consistent with the objective probabilities implied by the economic model. The analysis is centrally concerned with conditions under which agents can learn the underlying rational expectations equilibrium of the model. Such convergence is referred to as "expectations stabilization" or "stable expectations". A situation of unstable expectations is referred to as expectations-driven instability.
In this environment we study the stability properties of various con…gurations of monetary and …scal policy, speci…ed as simple rules. Monetary policy is given by a Taylor-type rule for the conduct of nominal interest-rate policy as a function of some measure of in ‡ation. Fiscal policy is given by a simple rule for the adjustment of the structural surplus in response to outstanding government liabilities. Given this policy framework, the analysis is interested in the role of the scale and composition of debt. In contrast to a rational-expectations analysis of the model, these characteristics of …scal policy have important implications for stabilization policy under learning dynamics. We show that the average maturity of debt can constrain the set of monetary and …scal policies that are consistent with expectations stabilization.
The source of instability derives from three model features. First, a monetary policy rule 2 that responds to in ‡ation, despite being 'passive'. Second, a positive steady-state debt level so that variations in government liabilities have …rst-order e¤ects on consumption. Third, the average duration of debt is greater than one period, so that variations in the price of bonds a¤ects the size of public debt. These e¤ects combine so that moderate maturities of debt generate instability by making debt issuance more volatile when in ‡ation expectations shift. On the one hand, in the neighborhood of rational expectations equilibrium, the price of the public debt portfolio becomes more sensitive to in ‡ation expectations the greater the average duration of debt. This makes bond issuance more sensitive to a given shift in in ‡ation expectations, because the quantity of issued debt depends on this price. On the other hand, as the average maturity rises, the amount of debt rolled over in any given period declineschanged bond prices pertain to a smaller fraction of issued debt: The former price e¤ect tends to amplify, and the latter portfolio e¤ect, dampen, the e¤ect of in ‡ation expectations on the evolution of debt. The net e¤ects generate instability in aggregate demand as holdings of the public debt are perceived as net wealth. And these e¤ects are largest for short to medium maturity debt.
The dependency of this basic insight on various parametric assumptions is explored in detail. A speci…c policy recommendation that emerges is that monetary policy should be conducted according to an interest-rate peg. While an analytic result is not feasible, extensive numerical analysis reveals that for all relevant regions of the parameter space, interest-rate pegs deliver stability under learning dynamics. This result holds regardless of the scale and composition of debt.
Because active …scal policy coupled with an interest-rate peg successfully stabilizes expectations, switching to an active …scal policy rule when the interest rate is at the zero lower bound can be an e¤ective policy option to prevent a de ‡ationary spiral. There are two caveats to this recommendation. First, the stability analysis has only local validity; that is the stability results hold provided agents'expectations are su¢ ciently close to rational expectations. A switch from a Ricardian regime with active monetary policy to an active …scal regime coupled with an interest-rate peg requires a signi…cant adjustment in public expectations. The success of such a policy is likely determined by the communication strategy followed by the monetary and …scal authority, and their credibility in following announced plans.
Second, we focus on rational expectations equilibria where the policy regime remains in place inde…nitely. As documented in Davig and Leeper (2006) for the US, policy regime switches are the norm. A switch to an active …scal regime in response to hitting the zero lower 3 bound would likely be temporary in nature. An extension of the stability analysis to regime switches is left for further research. 2 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 describes belief structure underpinning the assumed learning dynamics. Section 4 states some benchmark properties of the model for which analytical results are available. Section 5 provides benchmark parameter assumptions. Section 6 gives results for an interest rate rule that responds to contemporaneous in ‡ation. Section 7 gives analogous results for a forecast-based instrument rule. Section 8 explores the robustness of conclusions to variations in the assumed belief structure. Section 9 explores the robustness of conclusions to an alternative model of decision making. Section 10 concludes.
A Simple Model
The following section details the model studied by Eusepi and Preston (2011) . The model is similar in spirit to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003) used in many recent studies of monetary policy. The major di¤erence is the emphasis given to details of …scal policy and the incorporation of near-rational beliefs delivering an anticipated utility model as described by Kreps (1998) and Sargent (1999) . The analysis follows Marcet and Sargent (1989a) and Preston (2005b) , solving for optimal decisions conditional on current beliefs. The discussion here only presents the implied log-linear approximation in the neighborhood of a non-stochastic steady state. For additional detail the reader is referred to Eusepi and Preston (2011) .
Aggregate Demand and Supply
The model has an aggregate demand relation of the form
whereĈ t is consumption,^ t in ‡ation,{ t nominal interest rates,b m t 1 holdings of the public debt in real terms,P m t the price of the public debt and Branch, Davig, and McGough (2008) study the E-stability properties of regime switching models using learning models where only one-period-ahead expectations matter. Their methology could easily be adapted to the framework proposed in this paper. 4 denotes period after-tax income. This income in turn depends upon the real wage,ŵ t , dividends,^ T ; and lump-sum taxes,^ T . All model variables are properly interpreted as logdeviations from state-state. Household preferences are characterized by a discount factor satisfying 0 < < 1 and the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution > 0. The remaining parameters are s = = Y the steady-state ratio of taxes-to-output; the steady-state structural surplus-to-income ratio; a parameter indexing the average maturity of government debt (discussed further below); and Aggregate supply is determined by the generalized Phillips curvê
whereẐ t is an aggregate technology shock which satis…es
where 0 < Z < 1 and " Z;t stationary disturbance. The parameter satis…es the restrictions 0 < < 1 and = (1 ) (1 ) 1 . In a model of Calvo price adjustment, would denote the probability of a …rm not being able re-set prices in any given period.
Equations (1) and (2) can be derived from standard microfoundations and are valid for arbitrary expectations satisfying standard probability laws. It is assumed that households and …rms correctly understand their own objectives and any relevant constraints. However, in forecasting the various prices and state variables the are beyond their control but relevant to their decision problem they are assumed to have an incomplete economic model. Speci…cally, they are assumed to face uncertainty about the equilibrium mapping between state variables and market clearing prices. They approximate this mapping by extrapolating from historical patterns in observed data. As additional data become available the approximate model is revised. The structure of beliefs is discussed in more detail in section 3.
The …rst equation (1) and an adjustment for in ‡ation. The terms in the second line capture the additional prediction that households should consume a constant fraction of expected discounted future income. In contrast to permanent income theory, this model permits time variation in real interest rates, due either to changes in nominal interest rates or in ‡ation.
The second equation (2) can be derived from the aggregation of the optimal prices chosen by …rms to maximize the expectation discounted ‡ow of pro…ts under a Calvo-style pricesetting problem -see Yun (1996) . It is a generalized Phillips curve, specifying current in ‡ation as depending on contemporaneous values of wages and the technology shock, and expectations for these variables and in ‡ation into the inde…nite future. The presence of longterm expectations arise due to pricing frictions embodied in Calvo pricing. When a …rm has the opportunity to change its price in period t there is a probability T t that it will not get to change its price in the subsequent T t periods. The …rm must concern itself with macroeconomic conditions relevant to marginal costs into the inde…nite future when deciding the current price of its output. Future pro…ts are also discounted at the rate , which equals the inverse of the steady-state gross real interest rate.
The aggregation of optimal household and …rm spending and pricing plans, along with goods market clearing also deliver the following aggregate relations. Given optimal prices, …rms stand ready to supply desired output which determines aggregate hours aŝ
and comes from aggregation of …rm production technologies, which take labor as the only input. Wages and dividends are then determined from
where s C = C= Y is the steady-state consumption-to-output ratio, andĜ t government purchases which satis…es
where 0 < G < 1 and " G;t stationary disturbance.
Asset Prices and No-Arbitrage
There are two types of government debt: one-period government debt in zero net supply with priceP s t ; and a more general portfolio of government debt,b m t , in non-zero net supply with priceP m t . The former debt instrument satis…esP s t = { t and de…nes the period nominal interest rate, the instrument of central bank monetary policy. Following Woodford (1998) and Woodford (2001) the latter debt instrument has payment structure T (t+1) for T > t and 0 1. The asset can be interpreted as a portfolio of in…nitely many bonds, with weights along the maturity structure given by T (t+1) . The advantage of specifying the debt portfolio in this way is that it introduces only a single state variable whose properties are indexed by single parameter . Varying varies the average maturity of debt. For example, the case of one-period debt corresponds to = 0. A console bond corresponds to = 1.
Households' optimality conditions for holding each of the two assets provides the noarbitrage restriction{
Solving this relation forward and using transversality determines the price of the bond portfolio
The multiple-maturity debt portfolio is priced as the expected present discounted value of all future one-period interest rates, where the discount factor is given by . This expression makes evident that the average duration of the portfolio is given by (1 ) 1 . A central focus of the analysis will be the consequences of variations in average maturity for expectations stabilization.
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
The central bank is assumed to implement monetary policy according to the family of interest rate rules{
where 0 and 0 ! 1 are policy parameters. In practice we study only the limiting cases ! = 1, corresponding to a contemporaneous in ‡ation rule, and ! = 0, corresponding to an expectations-based in ‡ation rule. The stability properties of intermediate cases can be inferred once it is understood that, all else equal, the contemporaneous rule maximizes the stability region, while the expectations-based rule, minimizes the stability region, with the latter a subspace of the former.
The activities of the …scal authority are summarized by the relationŝ
which describe the evolution of total outstanding bonds -a log-linear approximation to the government's ‡ow budget constraint; the de…nition of government liabilities,l t ; tax collections speci…ed directly in terms of the structural surplus,ŝ t , with associated policy parameter l > 0;
and the de…nition of the structural surplus as the di¤erence between lump-sum tax collections and government purchases.
This completes the description of aggregate dynamics. To summarize, the model comprises the twelve aggregate relations (1)- (6), (8), (9)- (13) 
Belief Formation
Beliefs. This section describes the learning dynamics and the criterion to assess convergence of beliefs. The optimal decisions of households and …rms require forecasting the evolution of future prices -nominal interest rates, real wages, dividends, taxes and in ‡ation -and exogenous shocks. In the benchmark case, agents are assumed to use a linear econometric 
where 0 is a matrix with dimension (6 1) ; 1 a matrix with dimension (6 6); 2 a matrix of dimension (6 2); and e t a vector of regression errors. The belief structure is over- Expectations Stability. Using (14) to substitute for expectations in (1), (2) and (8) and solving with the intratemporal conditions of the model delivers the actual data generating
i be the matrix of coe¢ cients to estimate, u t = ^ t ;{ t ;ŵ t ;^ t ;ŝ t ;b t and q t = 1; u t ;Ĝ t ;Ẑ t . 1 ^ and 2 ^ are nonlinear functions of agents' model parameters. The stability under learning depends on the interaction between agents' model ( ) and the true model ( 1 ( )). The two models coincide only at the rational expectations equilibrium ( RE ). Marcet and Sargent (1989b) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) show that conditions for convergence are characterized by the local stability properties of the associated
where denotes notional time. The rational expectations equilibrium is said to be expectationally stable, or E-Stable, if this di¤erential equation is locally stable in the neighborhood of the rational expectations equilibrium where 1 RE = RE . 4 Because beliefs are over parameterized relative to the rational expectations equilibrium local stability is sometimes referred to as strong E-Stability. See Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for further discussion.
Benchmark Implications
To anchor ideas and provide a comparative benchmark, it is useful to state model properties under rational expectations. In this paper we focus on a particular policy con…guration where …scal policy is 'active'and monetary policy is 'passive'in the sense of Leeper (1991) .
Our motivation for doing so re ‡ects both historical and contemporary examples of such policy con…gurations. For example, Davig and Leeper (2006) Proposition 1 Consider the monetary policy rule (9) with ! = 1. Under rational expectations the following conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for a unique bounded equilibrium:
This is a familiar result in New Keynesian monetary economics …rst due to Leeper (1991) .
In the language of that paper, the …rst restriction requires monetary policy to be passive; and 4 Standard results for ordinary di¤erential equations imply that a …xed point is locally asymptotically stable if all eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix D [ ( ) ( )] have negative real parts (where D denotes the di¤erentiation operator and the Jacobian is understood to be evaluated at the relevant rational expectations equilibrium). the second set of restrictions require …scal policy to be active. The restrictions are referred to as the Leeper conditions. In the resulting non-Ricardian equilibria, debt has monetary consequences -indeed, the level of real debt is a state variable relevant to the determination of all model variables in equilibrium. This is the …scal theory of the price level. Under learning, the following analogous result can be established.
Proposition 2 Consider the monetary policy rule (9) with ! = 1. Under learning dynamics, assuming there is only one-period debt, = 0, the following conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for E-Stability:
A sketch of the proof can be found in the technical appendix of Eusepi and Preston (2010b) . In the case of one-period debt and contemporaneous monetary policy rule (! = 1) the conditions for expectational stability are isomorphic to those for determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium. This coincidence in requirements is only true for one-period debt.
As the maturity structure of debt increases from one period -that is, as is increased from zero -the equivalence result breaks down. Details of debt management and …scal policy matter for expectations stability.
Calibration
The analysis proceeds numerically. No attempt is made to …t the model to data. Instead, we to-income ratio is s C = 0:8. The autoregressive coe¢ cients for the exogenous processes for technology and government purchases are Z = G = 0:6. 6
The analysis now considers variations in these benchmark assumptions that are relevant to the question of expectations stability. Given a particular choice of parameters, we investigate how E-Stability is a¤ected by varying and the average debt duration . The con…guration of monetary and …scal polices are always consistent with the requirements for a unique bounded rational expectations equilibrium. Discussion is organized around two speci…cations of monetary policy: a contemporaneous interest-rate rule and an expectations-based interest-rate rule.
6 A Contemporaneous Taylor Rule
Basic Results
Our study of stability begins with a nominal interest-rate rule that responds only to contemporaneous realizations of in ‡ation -the monetary policy rule (9) Consistent with proposition 1, when there is only one-period debt, so that = 0, the Leeper conditions hold. As the average duration of debt is increased with higher values of , the stability regions tend to contract, with more pronounced di¤erences for large values of the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption. However, the e¤ects are not monotonic: for su¢ ciently long-duration debt, the stability regions tend to expand again, 6 The autoregressive coe¢ cients do not play an important role in the stability analysis. To give a concrete example, for the largest inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the largest range of monetary policies giving instability occurs around = 0:7: This corresponds to an average duration of debt roughly equal to 7 months. A value of = 0:975 would deliver an average maturity debt around 7 years, comparable to Japan. At this average debt maturity most choices of passive monetary policy are consistent with expectational stability.
Choices of maturity structure between 6 and 24 months, however, promote instability from learning dynamics. These …ndings are consistent with the analysis of Eusepi and Preston (2011) , which considers the same model under active monetary and passive …scal regimes.
Inspecting the Mechanism
Instability depends on three model features. First, a monetary policy rule that responds to in ‡ation, despite being 'passive': that is 0 < < 1. Second, a positive steady-state debt level so that variations in government liabilities have …rst-order e¤ects on consumption. Third, the average duration of debt is higher than one period, so that variations in the price of bonds a¤ects the size of public debt. We develop the importance of each model component in some detail -most subsequent results can be understood as resulting from some combination of the documented e¤ects.
A simple example. To begin, assume that monetary policy is given by some purely exogenous process and that …scal policy is conducted to ensure a zero steady-state level of debt: = = 0. To further simplify, assume ! 0 giving perfectly elastic labor supply.
Equations (1) and (10) becomê
under these parametric assumptions. 7 Note that the evolution of debt is independent of expectations and that consumption demand has no direct dependence on debt. However, there
is an indirect dependence of consumption demand on debt through expectations formationin the rational expectations equilibrium all variables depend on debt, and learning dynamics are such that beliefs are in the neighborhood of these rational expectations.
Now consider an arbitrary increase in in ‡ation expectations. Aggregate demand rises because of lower expected real rates. Higher aggregate demand and thus higher wages increase in ‡ation which, in turn, decreases the real value of government debt. At the rational expectations equilibrium both wages and in ‡ation are increasing in the level of real debt. As agents' beliefs are near rational expectations, the decline in real debt lowers in ‡ation and wage expectations, o¤setting the initial rise in beliefs; the economy converges back to its steady state. With zero steady-state debt, and a monetary policy that makes the interest rate evolve independently of endogenous variables, the economy is inherently stable.
The general case. To gain intuition in the general model, substitute (9) and (8) for the nominal interest rate and the bond price into the equations determining consumption, (1), and debt, (10), to yield
Again consider the consequence of a rise in in ‡ation expectations. With ; ; > 0 the aggregate demand and debt equations are a¤ected by monetary and …scal policy in three important ways. First, real debt has a direct e¤ect on aggregate demand, as shown in the …rst line of (16). Holding everything else constant, as debt increases so does consumption.
Second, changes in in ‡ation expectations and therefore nominal interest rates and the price of bonds, produce substitution and income e¤ects. The second line gives the substitution e¤ect.
Higher in ‡ation expectations lower real interest rates and increase demand. The third line of the consumption equation contains three distinct channels of income e¤ect: the …rst term captures the direct e¤ect of higher nominal interest rates on aggregate demand, because given debt holdings capture a higher future return. The second term captures the e¤ects of changes in the price of the bond on aggregate demand -higher nominal interest rates imply a fall in the asset's value and therefore diminished wealth e¤ects on demand. The third term captures the fact that in ‡ation erodes the real value of bond holdings. The sum of these three terms is least negative when = 0. As the average duration of debt increases with ; the e¤ects of higher anticipated in ‡ation on demand increase monotonically from
imparting an ever larger restraining in ‡uence. Hence changes in in ‡ation expectations related to debt holdings appear to have a stabilizing e¤ect on consumption -in so far as increases in in ‡ation expectations reduce demand which in turn reduce price pressure through the Phillips curve.
Debt Dynamics. Third, moving to the debt equation (17), with > 0, rising average duration of debt tends to amplify the e¤ects of bond-price changes on the evolution of debt.
These e¤ects depend on the term
which is quadratic in the parameter . Here shifts in expected in ‡ation are destabilizing.
Increases in in ‡ation expectations lead to an increase in debt, which weakens the stabilizing e¤ects of higher actual in ‡ation discussed above. Higher debt in turn increases aggregate demand, validating the rise in in ‡ation expectations. At some intermediate value of , say , the e¤ects of shifts in in ‡ation expectation are strongest. It follows that for < the instability region is largest. To think about this non-linearity note the following. On the one hand, it is straight forward to show that, in the neighborhood of rational expectations equilibrium, the bond price becomes more sensitive to in ‡ation expectations the greater the average duration of debt. This makes the bond issuance more sensitive to a given shift in in ‡ation expectations. On the other hand, as the average maturity rises, the amount of debt rolled over in any given period declines -changed bond prices pertain to a smaller fraction of issued debt, captured by the term (1 ) : The former price e¤ect tends to amplify, and the latter portfolio e¤ect, dampen, the e¤ect of in ‡ation expectations on the evolution of debt.
The net e¤ects generate the non-linearity inherent in (18). This third e¤ect is then the source of instability in the model.
Expectations formation tends to amplify this instability. Non-Ricardian equilibria that result from the …scal theory of the price level render debt a determinant of equilibrium outcomes of all variables. This means that forecasts of relevant prices depend on debt. That debt becomes more sensitive to in ‡ation expectations for average maturities, makes learning the statistical properties of prices more di¢ cult. This contributes to instability.
Central then to this result is the interaction of public debt with the e¤ects of shifting in ‡a-tion expectations on the evolution of this debt. Shifting in ‡ation expectations only destabilize demand indirectly by changing the price at which debt is re-issued and therefore the quantity of real debt. For these e¤ects to matter, the average maturity of debt must be such that < . Indeed, in the limiting cases ! 0 and ! 1 in ‡ation expectations have no consequences for the evolution of real debt holdings -and the rational expectations equilibrium is expectationally stable under the Leeper conditions. For moderate values of average maturity, the bond-price e¤ects on the level of outstanding debt are largest, which in turn delivers the largest consumption demand e¤ects. But only if s 1 C > 0 -if the average level of debt were zero, there would be no wealth e¤ects from debt on consumption demand.
The Role of Intertemporal Substitution and Time Preference
Intertemporal Substitution. The documented instability depends on the preference parameters, and , which determine incentives to substitute labor and consumption intertemporally. To decipher the dependency, note that s 1 C is decreasing in the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution, inducing both smaller (destabilizing) wealth e¤ects from holding debt and smaller (stabilizing) wealth e¤ects from changes in expected in ‡ation. Crucially, since s 1 C declines at a slower rate than the parameter , any increase in real debt has relatively stronger impact on consumption than the corresponding increase in the current nominal rate. This can be seen by inspecting the term
in the …rst line of (16). As a consequence, the economy becomes more unstable as increases.
Higher values of increase s 1 C and thus increase both stabilizing and de-stabilizing wealth e¤ects from expected in ‡ation and debt holdings. It also induces a relatively higher response of consumption to 1) changes in debt relative to the current interest rate and 2) changes in expected wages. Concerning the latter, the wage elasticity of consumption ranges from a minimum of 1 for ! 0 and a maximum of s 1 C ( 1) = when 1 = 0. Given that expected wages are positively associated with real debt, an higher consumption response to wages is destabilizing. 8 Lower elasticities of labor supply widen the instability region.
Given the relative importance of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the level of steady-state debt, Figure 2 plots the stability regions in ; b= 4 Y space, so that the debtto-output ratio is in annual terms. Parameters that lie above the contour deliver instability, while for parameters below the rational expectations equilibrium is E-Stable. Elevated debt-tooutput ratios render the economy less stable: as above, higher or higher increase the term
^ t , magnifying the wealth e¤ects of real debt 'net'of the current interest rate. However, even the high debt-to-output ratio of Japan requires a very low elasticity of substitution for consumption to generate expectational instability.
Time Preference. Figure 3 plots the E-Stability regions again in ( ; ) space, but examines the dependency on the discount factor . This might be thought an important 8 In turn, expected pro…ts are negatively associated with debt and thus have a stabilizing e¤ect. Figure 3: The …gure describes the E-stability region in the ( ; ) space. Parameters that lie above the curve deliver instability, while for parameters below the REE is E-stable.
e¤ect by lowering the e¤ects on in ‡ation of a change in current and expected interest rates. In fact a higher value of decreases the sensitivity of current in ‡ation to current and expected demand conditions by ‡attening the Phillips curve. Therefore a more responsive monetary policy rule (that is a higher ) has less e¤ect on in ‡ation.
A Special Case
A special case of the active …scal and passive monetary regime under examination is an interestrate policy that is purely exogenous combined with a policy for the structural surplus that is purely exogenous. Such a regime might sound to be of solely academic interest but can be argued to be of considerable historical and contemporary interest. Indeed, US monetary policy from 1942 until 1951 is most accurately described in this way. Called a "bond-price support regime", bond-prices were pegged, with …scal policy assuming the role of active stabilization.
As is well understood, the implied non-Ricardian equilibrium is unique and ensures a welldetermined price level. Woodford (2001) argues that the in ‡ation data for this period are consistent with this characterization of policy.
More recently, the US …nancial crises has heightened interest in such policy con…gurations.
In many countries interest-rate policy has been subject to the constraint of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, while substantial …scal stimulus has been provided with little immediate concern for the level of indebtedness. This policy con…guration can reasonably be characterized as an interest-rate peg combined with exogenous structural surpluses, particularly given the substantial uncertainty about the scale, scope and duration of various policy initiatives. And even if such a characterization seems inappropriate, to the extent that agents place some probability weight on this con…guration of policy, there could be important consequences for dynamics -see Bianchi (2010) , Davig and Leeper (2006) and Sims (2011) .
As such it is worth exploring the stabilization properties of this kind of policy regime, and speci…cally their dependency on the maturity structure of debt.
Proposition 2 establishes that this policy con…guration is remarkably stable in the case of one-period debt -the requirements for expectational stability are identical to those for a unique bounded rational expectations equilibrium. The Leeper conditions hold. This is entirely consistent with the results above which show that more active …scal and monetary rules can lead to instability. While analytical results could not be determined for the general case of multiple-maturity debt, a numerical study of the conditions for expectational stability permits the following claim. Then the rational expectations equilibrium is found to be E-Stable for all indicated combinations of parameter values.
Despite the lack of formal proof, this numerical evidence strongly suggests that a nominal interest-rate peg exhibits remarkable stability in the case of multiple-maturity debt. As such, switching to an active …scal policy rule which delivers aggressive …scal stimulus when the interest rate is at the zero lower bound can be an e¤ective policy option to prevent a de ‡ationary spiral.
There are two caveats to this recommendation. First, the stability analysis has only local validity; that is the stability results hold provided agents' expectations are su¢ ciently close to rational expectations. A switch from a Ricardian regime with active monetary policy to an active …scal regime coupled with an interest-rate peg requires a signi…cant adjustment in public expectations. The success of such a policy is likely determined by the communication strategy followed by the monetary and …scal authority, and their credibility in following announced plans. Second, we focus on rational expectations equilibria where the policy regime remains in place inde…nitely. As documented in Davig and Leeper (2006) for the US, policy regime switches are the norm. A switch to an active …scal regime in response to hitting the zero lower bound would likely be temporary in nature. An extension of the stability analysis to regime switches is left for further research, but the tools for such inquiry can be found in Branch, Davig, and McGough (2008) which studies the E-Stability properties of regime switching models using learning models where only one-period-ahead expectations matter.
Forward-looking policy rule
Now consider the policy rule (9) with > 0 and ! = 0. When agents must learn about the conduct of policy, Eusepi and Preston (2010b) show that expectations-based interest-rate rules can deliver instability even when …scal policy is active. 10 Here we explore the consequences of di¤erent average maturities of debt for these insights. As before, the analysis is organized by examining speci…c features of household preferences -the role of intertemporal substitution of consumption and leisure and the discount factor.
We also study the role of central bank communication in the stability analysis. Eusepi and Preston (2010a) and Eusepi and Preston (2010b) analyze implications of agents having di¤er-ing degrees of information about the conduct of monetary policy. The case of agents having no knowledge of the policy rule employed by monetary authority is called "no communication".
Households and …rms must infer the statistical properties of nominal interest-rate policy from historical realizations of this variable and the state. In contrast, the case when agents know the monetary policy rule is called "communication". The import of this assumption is that households and …rms can make policy-consistent forecasts. Beliefs about the joint probability distribution of in ‡ation and nominal interest rates is consistent with the restriction implied by the monetary policy rule. This permits more accurate forecasts, which is conducive to macroeconomic stability. 11 1 0 Preston (2006 Preston ( , 2008 also discusses a range of di¢ culties that expectations-based instrument rules for the nominal interest rate pose for stabilization policy under learning dynamics.
1 1 Throughout it is assumed that agents have no knowledge of the …scal policy rules. This assumption re ‡ects that in practice there has not been a similar emphasis on questions of communication in the theory and practice of …scal policy. The analysis extends the treatments of Eusepi and Preston (2010a, 2010b) by considering active …scal and passive monetary policy in an environment of multiple maturity debt, and properly accounting for the
The Case of No Communication
In the case of no communication about monetary policy, agents forecast future interest rates according to the belief structure described in section 3. With expectations-based policy rules, lack of knowledge of the policy rule can be a source of instability which is not related to wealth e¤ects stemming from …scal policy or debt dynamics. Instead, instability arises from a failure of the central bank to manage expectations. Because interest-rate policy depends on in ‡ation expectations, and in ‡ation expectations exhibit sluggish adjustment, the central bank responds slowly to changing economic conditions; and private agents themselves respond with a delay to changes in monetary policy because of learning dynamics. As a result, the central bank responds too much and too late, creating instability in aggregate demand. This channel of instability is documented in Eusepi and Preston (2010b) . It is also an example of Friedman (1968) 's long and variable lags as a source of macroeconomic instability, and the basis of his criticism of procedures to implement monetary policy using interest-rate rules. Figure 4 shows the E-Stability region in the ( ; ) space for two di¤erent economies distinguished by = 2 and 25. Parameters pairs that lie above the curve deliver instability, while for parameter pairs below the rational expectations equilibrium is E-Stable. It is immediate that the overall instability region is considerably wider when compared with an economy with a contemporaneous Taylor rule as in Figure 1 In contrast to the previous section, an higher average duration of debt monotonically widens the instability region. For values of near unity, monetary policy must exhibit almost no sensitivity to variations in in ‡ation -interest rates are required to be exogenous to deliver stability. Consistent with proposition 2 of Eusepi and Preston (2010b) , even an economy with one-period debt displays instability for some combination of parameter values. The instability result re ‡ects the di¤erent mechanism that is at work in the case of expectationsbased nominal interest-rate rules when compared with contemporaneous interest-rate rules.
Longer debt maturity implies that 'unanchored'expectations about future interest rates have a larger impact on the economy through variations in bond prices which in turn a¤ects the evolution of aggregate demand.
The intuition can again be described in terms of equation (16), where now we assume endogeneity of labor supply decisions on optimal consumption -see Eusepi and Preston (2011) for a discussion of the latter. 
From this relation, higher increases the relative importance of substitution e¤ects (the …rst term), which are the source of aggregate demand instability -agents fail to project accurately future real interest rates. 12 Interestingly, the source of instability is not …scal policy per se, but agents' lack of information about the monetary policy rule. Monetary policy remains important even if it is passive! Figure 4 reveals two other insights. First, instability arises for parameter values which are consistent with a range of evidence using both household and aggregate consumption data:
for example, inverse elasticities of intertemporal substitution equal to 2 -see Hall (2009) and Basu and Kimball (2000) . Second, lower elasticities of intertemporal substitution of consumption assist stability under learning dynamics. While higher values of inverse elasticity, Figure 5: The …gure describes the E-stability region in the ( ; ) space. Parameters that lie above the curve deliver instability, while for parameters below the REE is E-stable.
, tend to raise the importance of wealth e¤ects of debt holdings on aggregate demand (as discussed above), they also decrease the sensitivity of aggregate consumption to expected real interest rates. Because these forecasted real interest rates are the dominant source of instability, reducing the elasticity of intertemporal substitution promotes E-Stability under forecast-based instrument rules -see again (19). Figure 6: The …gure describes the E-stability region in the ( ; ) space. Parameters that lie above the curve deliver instability, while for parameters below the REE is E-stable.
The Case of Communication
interest-rates in any period t are computed aŝ
for all T t. Communication improves the stabilization properties of forecast-based instrument rules by providing a more accurate forecast of future real interest rates. 
The Role of Financial Market Expectations
The belief structure laid out in Section 3 has the property that the no-arbitrage condition (7) is satis…ed in all periods of the household's decision horizon. Agent's beliefs determine a forecast of the future sequence of one-period interest rates f{ T g from which the multiple-maturity bond portfolio is priced using (8). Because the bond pricing equation is an implication of the noarbitrage condition, relation (7) is necessarily satis…ed at all dates.
An alternative approach would be to suppose households forecast future bond prices directly using some econometric model, which combined with (7) would determine a no-arbitrage consistent forecast path for the one-period interest rate. While these two approaches are equivalent under rational expectations, they will in general di¤er under arbitrary assumptions on belief formation. Indeed, consider augmenting the beliefs structure (14) with an additional dependent variable in the price of the multiple-maturity bond portfolio. Then absent the restrictions imposed by a rational expectations equilibrium analysis -which would impose the speci…c restriction that beliefs are consistent with no-arbitrage -the augmented belief structure will permit very general relationships between the bond price and the period interest rate -there is no reason to suppose that the implied forecast would satisfy (7).
We now consider the consequences of this alternative formulation of …nancial market beliefs. This is called unanchored …nancial market expectations since one less optimality condition is exploited relative to earlier analysis -speci…cally, the transversality condition. Formally these assumptions imply two changes to the model. The equations for the bond price and consumption, (8) and (1), are replaced by the no-arbitrage condition (7) which determines the asset price asP
and the consumption decision rulê
obtained by substitution for nominal interests rates by (7) The …gure describes the E-stability region in the ( ; ) space. Parameters that lie above the curve deliver instability, while for parameters below the REE is E-stable. Figure 7 shows the E-Stability region in the ( ; ) space for the case of unanchored …-nancial expectations. Monetary policy is again given by a rule with ! = 1, implying interest rates respond only to current in ‡ation. Here we set = 2 and = 1 -parameter values that generated little instability in the case of a contemporaneous interest rate rule. It is immediate that the speci…cation of …nancial market expectations is important for macroeconomic stability. The …gure reveals an humped-shaped relation between debt duration and the stability region. Intermediate values of debt enlarge the instability area, while short-term and long-term maturities deliver a wider stability set.
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The intuition for this result is similar to the discussion in the section 6. However, the instability region is much wider. Unanchored …nancial expectations limit the in ‡uence of nominal interest-rate policy on aggregate demand. This can been seen from the aggregate demand relation (20) . When the average maturity of debt is unity, so that = 0, the model is isomorphic to the model under anchored …nancial expectations. Here the multiple-maturity debt portfolio collapses to one-period bonds, which satisfyP s t =P m t = { t . Even though agents only have a forecasting model in the bond price this is equivalent to forecasting the period interest rate when there is only one-period debt. As the average maturity structure of debt increases this equivalence breaks down. An implication is that only current interest rates have a direct e¤ect of aggregate demand. This substantially weakens the restraining in ‡uence of future interest-rate policy on aggregate demand. Finally, instability occurs also in the case of = 1. This is because, even if debt does not depend on expectations, the price of debt does. It is determined by the no-arbitrage condition
and it thus depends on expected future prices.
Alternative Models of Learning
Many recent papers have proposed analyses of learning dynamics in the context of models where agents solve in…nite-horizon decision problems, but without requiring that agents make forecasts more than one period into the future. In these papers, agents'decisions depend only on forecasts of future variables that appear in Euler equations used to characterize rational expectations equilibrium. Important contributions include Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Evans and Honkapohja (2003) . Of most relevance to the present study is Evans and Honkapohja (2007) which similarly studies the interaction of monetary and …scal policy, but in a model of learning dynamics in which only one-period-ahead expectations matter to expenditure and pricing plans of households and …rms. The following section replicates part of their analysis in the context of the model developed here, and contrasts the resulting …ndings with those of section 6.
Since the optimal decision rules for households and …rms presented in section 2 are valid under arbitrary assumptions on expectations formation, they are valid under the rational expectations assumption. Application of this assumption implies the law of iterated expectations to hold for the aggregate expectations operator and permits simpli…cation of relations (10) and (11) in the paper to the following aggregate Euler equation and Phillips curve: 13
where E t denotes rational expectations. Under learning dynamics, with only one-period-ahead expectations, it is assumed that aggregate demand and supply conditions are determined bŷ
One other model equation depends on expectations: the no-arbitrage condition. Remaining within the spirit of the one-period expectation approach, proceed under the assumption that …nancial expectations are unanchored so that the restriction
determines the price of multiple-maturity debt, given expectations about this price next period, and current nominal interest rates. This replaceŝ It is immediate that this model represents a fundamentally di¤erent approach to decision making. Taxes and debt holdings have no direct relevance to economic decisions -1 3 See Preston (2005a Preston ( , 2005b for a detailed discussion.
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and speci…cally the details of debt-management policy have no consequences for household spending plans. These model features only matter to the extent that they shape the evolution of beliefs in the neighborhood of rational expectations equilibrium. This turns out to be important.
In the one-period-ahead forecasting model, de…ned by replacing relations (1), (2) and (8) with (21), (22) and (7) in the benchmark model, the following stability result obtains.
Proposition 4 Consider the monetary policy rule (9) with ! = 1. Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for expectational stability are 0 < 1 and 0 l < 1 or l > 1 + 1 .
This generalizes one speci…c result of the Evans and Honkapohja (2007) analysis to a model with nominal rigidities. 14 When only one-period-ahead expectations matter, the Leeper conditions are necessary and su¢ cient to rule out expectations-driven instability. In contrast, in a model of optimal decisions, these conditions obtain only if the average maturity of debt is equal to unity. Absent this property, the analysis of this paper suggests a smaller menu of policies is consistent with expectations stabilization. Debt management policy can represent an important constraint on the design of monetary policy.
Conclusion
This paper applied the framework developed in Eusepi and Preston (2011) to examine the consequences of the scale and composition of the public debt in policy regimes in which monetary policy is 'passive' and …scal policy 'active'. This con…guration of policy is argued to be of both historical and contemporary interest, in economies such as the US and Japan.
The central result is that higher average levels and moderate average maturities of debt can induce macroeconomic stability for a range of policies speci…ed as simple rules. In contrast, very short and long average debt maturities are often more conducive to stability. However, regardless of the scale and composition of debt, interest-rate pegs combined with active …scal policies almost always ensure macroeconomic stability. This suggests that in periods where the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is a relevant constraint on policy design, a switch in …scal regime is desirable.
1 4 The proof is available on request.
30

